Nigeria and Democratic Progress by Elections in Africa by Cassani, Andrea & Carbone, Giovanni
www.ssoar.info
Nigeria and Democratic Progress by Elections in
Africa
Cassani, Andrea; Carbone, Giovanni
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Cassani, A., & Carbone, G. (2016). Nigeria and Democratic Progress by Elections in Africa. Africa Spectrum, 51(3),
33-59. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-9863
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-ND Licence
(Attribution-NoDerivatives). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0
              Africa   
       Spectrum 
 
 
 
Carbone, Giovanni / Cassani, Andrea (2016), 
Nigeria and Democratic Progress by Elections in Africa, in: Africa Spectrum,  
51, 3, 33–59. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-9863 
ISSN: 1868-6869 (online), ISSN: 0002-0397 (print) 
 
The online version of this and the other articles can be found at: 
<www.africa-spectrum.org> 
 
Published by 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of African Affairs  
in co-operation with the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation Uppsala and Hamburg 
University Press. 
 
Africa Spectrum is an Open Access publication.  
It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.   
 
To subscribe to the print edition: <iaa@giga-hamburg.de> 
For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.africa-spectrum.org> 
 
Africa Spectrum is part of the GIGA Journal Family which includes: 
● ●Africa Spectrum  Journal of Current Chinese Affairs  Journal of Current Southeast 
● ●Asian Affairs  Journal of Politics in Latin America  <www.giga-journal-family.org> 
  Africa Spectrum 3/2016: 33–59   
 
 
Nigeria and Democratic Progress by 
Elections in Africa 
Giovanni Carbone and Andrea Cassani 
Abstract: Elections do not always advance democratisation, yet they can. 
We outline a democratisation-by-elections model according to which the 
opportunities for political change opened up by each electoral round build 
on previous election-related democratic progress. We focus on Nigeria, 
interpret the recent executive turnover in light of previous elections, and 
set the country within the comparative context of Africa’s democratisation. 
Using a new Africa Leadership Change dataset, we use election-related 
events to examine the diverse routes that African regimes have taken since 
1990. The analysis highlights two major syndromes: democratic stagnation 
and recession. In a sizeable group, however, the institutionalisation of 
democracy has been making gradual progress. While there is no predeter-
mined way to advance democracy, the reiteration of elections can be in-
strumental in such advancement. 
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The Nigerian election of 2015, in which the country’s citizens cast their 
ballots for a fifth consecutive round since the establishment of the Fourth 
Republic, again demonstrated how important elections can be. Marking an 
unprecedented watershed in the history of Nigeria, opposition candidate 
Muhammadu Buhari soundly defeated incumbent president Goodluck 
Jonathan. Africa’s most populous country and largest economy joined the 
limited number of sub-Saharan states whose voters had been able to oust a 
sitting president and hand power to the opposition. While political con-
tinuities are bound to hamper Nigeria’s political renewal and its tortuous 
progress towards democratic politics, the achievement of a government 
turnover via elections represents a new cornerstone upon which to con-
tinue building. Its full importance is best understood when interpreted in 
light of the electoral path that the country has followed since 1999, and 
compared with the trajectories experienced by other African countries 
over the past 25 years. 
Africa’s political landscape has changed dramatically since the end 
of the Cold War. Following the collapse of old regimes, African coun-
tries embarked on transitions to multi-partyism that were initially wel-
comed as the beginning of a continent-wide wave of democratisation. 
Hopes ran high that political power would be depersonalised through the 
introduction of regularised procedures for leadership selection and re-
placement. However, Africa’s reforms confirmed that elections do not 
always equate to democracy, as political transitions soon took various 
divergent routes. In several cases, change only affected the surface of 
politics, with old and new incumbent elites maintaining their grip on 
power. In other cases, elections did advance democratisation, even when 
voting was at times flawed, by favouring the rooting of a logic of free 
and fair competition. 
Voting does not always propel democratisation, but it sometimes 
does. But how do elections advance democratisation, if and when they 
do? Theory remains rather inconclusive on this point, with scholars 
stressing either the reiteration of elections or their role as focal points of 
agency. These alternative views should be reconsidered within a more 
comprehensive explanatory framework. In particular, we suggest, the 
opportunities for democratic progress that each electoral round raises 
are, to some extent, shaped by previous election-related achievements.  
In the first two sections of the article, we review the role of elec-
tions in Africa’s democratisation and present our approach to explaining 
how the former can favour the latter. We identify precise election-related 
events that we interpret as both indicators of democratic progress and 
potential drivers of further advancement. We then focus on the Nigerian 
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case. First, we illustrate the path that Nigeria has followed since the 1999 
transition to multiparty politics, election by election. We then analyse the 
2015 electoral outcome in light of previous electoral rounds and empha-
sise how the former built on the latter. We broaden the scope of the 
analysis in the fourth section by comparing contemporary sub-Saharan 
African regimes on the basis of electoral achievements and identifying 
some clusters of countries that capture the divergent paths of “democra-
tisation by elections” that these countries have followed. In the final 
section, we discuss whether and how the presidential election and alter-
nation in Nigeria represented decisive events in the country’s path to-
wards democracy. 
Elections and Democratising Electoral 
Outcomes in Africa: Beyond the  
Third-Wave Reforms 
After the third wave of democratic reforms reached the shores of Africa 
in the early 1990s, the vast majority of countries on the continent em-
barked on political transitions that soon took divergent directions. A 
number of valuable efforts have been made to pin these processes down, 
using either regime (sub)types or democratic gradations. These attempts 
have invariably been confronted with the composite nature of democ-
racy and the complexity of the African context. Regime types tend to 
crystallise the more fluid and dynamic situation that characterises African 
third-wave polities. Subtypes are often idiosyncratic, and recording the 
level or degree of democracy on a yearly basis risks overemphasising 
ephemeral changes. In a region in which democratisation is better under-
stood as a “protracted” process (Barkan 2000), scholars’ efforts to track 
and explain sub-Saharan political trajectories have increasingly focused 
on elections, which are the sole common denominator of all African 
regime transitions since the early 1990s.  
Elections do not equal democracy, even when they are periodically 
repeated and open to opposition parties (Schmitter and Karl 1991). In a 
famous critique, Carothers concluded that “elections are in and of them-
selves largely insignificant to democratization” (2002: 16). Brownlee con-
sidered elections to be “symptoms, not causes” (2007: 10), whereas Le-
vitsky and Way argued that “multiparty elections are not by themselves 
an independent cause of democratization” (2010: 22). Other authors 
have seen a causal relationship but disagreed on the exact nature of the 
election effect. There is ample evidence that incumbent autocrats can use 
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popular votes to overcome the weaknesses of more traditional forms of 
dictatorship, thus turning them into outright tools of authoritarian rule 
(for a review, see Gandhi and Lust 2009). Even more troubling is the fact 
that voting in Africa has frequently been associated with violence (Fjelde 
and Höglund 2016). 
However, elections are indicators of democracy and even potential 
drivers of democratic progress. Although there is little doubt that full 
democratisation requires political developments that go well beyond 
elections, no contemporary nation that does not go to the polls on a 
regular basis has ever been deemed democratic. Moreover, when new 
democratic advances are attributed to a country, this is typically in rela-
tion to electoral rounds, whether because the latter marked the end of 
dictatorial rule, because their freedom and fairness was improved, be-
cause the opposition gained political strength, or because peaceful hand-
overs of power took place. 
Most importantly, elections can also advance democratisation. Lind-
berg (2006, 2009) found that elections in Africa have been largely benefi-
cial to democratisation. The reiteration of elections, even when flawed, can 
imbue “society with certain democratic qualities,” raising the cost of 
repression and reducing the cost of tolerance (Lindberg 2006: 139). Lind-
berg’s heartening thesis has been at the centre of a heated debate. Critics 
have noted that empirical evidence of the democratising effect of elections 
is weak, especially outside Africa, and they have highlighted the risk of 
theoretical inconclusiveness (Bogaards 2014). Schedler (2013) contended 
that elections represent arenas of struggle rather than causes of actor be-
haviour. To the extent that incumbents have successfully managed to skew 
the playing field in their own favour, elections have a regime-sustaining 
effect. Elections can also have a regime-subverting effect and favour de-
mocratisation (Hadenius and Teorell 2007), but this remains largely con-
tingent upon a number of intervening factors (Morse 2012; Bratton 2013). 
Rather than viewing the self-enforcing and conditional variants of 
“democratisation by elections” as alternative to each other, we maintain 
that Schedler’s view of elections as stand-alone focal points for possible 
change can be integrated with Lindberg’s emphasis on the periodic re-
iteration of elections. Elections can be drivers of and springboards for 
further democratic achievements. As focal points of agency, they peri-
odically open up windows of opportunity for political change. Crucially, 
however, the opportunities for political change that each electoral round 
opens up are not fully independent from each other, but typically build 
on previous election-related democratic progress, if any exists. 
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Democratic progress through elections occurs with the achievement 
of “democratising electoral outcomes” (cf. Howard and Roessler 2006). 
The spectrum of possible democratising electoral outcomes (DEOs) 
ranges from the expansion of civil liberties to more procedural accom-
plishments. While DEOs do not necessarily correspond to full democra-
tisation, are no guarantee of long-term improvements, and cannot prevent 
future reversals, they represent key steps towards the institutionalisation of 
political democracy – a process of “transforming the set of democratic 
rules and institutions agreed upon in the transition phase into regular, 
acceptable, and predictable patterns” (Doorenspleet and Kopecky 2008: 
702). Without dismissing the salience of civil liberties, which are a key 
dimension of democracy and a requisite for citizens’ political empower-
ment and genuine pluralism, our focus here is on procedural achievements. 
We deem these to be of primary importance on a continent that has his-
torically suffered from a lack of regularised mechanisms for leadership 
change and an inability to enforce them, as evidenced by as many as 
41 rulers who stayed in power for between 20 and 42 years, and by a string 
of 94 military coups d’état between 1960 and 2014. Procedural election-
related achievements include the introduction of multiparty voting; the 
survival of electoral rule; the enforcement of constitutional rule of law, 
including compliance with term limits; and executive changes, from intra-
party succession to turnovers. To the extent that these events represent 
gradual moves away from unstable or non-democratic political practices 
towards a stable and institutionalised pluralist system that can be reason-
ably expected to last into the future, they ultimately count as true – if only 
basic and incomplete – democratic progress. 
The introduction of elections marks the potential demise of dicta-
torial regimes (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). The repetition of voting 
at regular intervals is crucial for turning elections into an established, 
broadly accepted pattern (Bratton 1998). Time-limited mandates estab-
lish an endpoint for a leader’s duration in power (Posner and Young 
2007). Power transfers denote a separation between political office and 
individual office-holders (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Executive turn-
overs deserve particular consideration. We do not consider alternation in 
office to be a necessary or sufficient condition for democracy (Prze-
worski et al. 2000; Schedler 2013). For example, despite half a century of 
uninterrupted rule by the same political party, Botswana is widely con-
sidered democratic. However, a country undergoes a crucially important 
step in its democratic development when elections result in an incum-
bent accepting defeat and peacefully handing over power to an opposi-
tion leader. This is especially true in Africa, where the pre-1990 politics 
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were overwhelmingly dominated by a combination of rulers overstaying 
their time in power and their frequently violent and unregulated removal 
from office. Executive turnovers represent rather unequivocal signs of 
acceptance of democracy as “a system in which parties lose elections” 
(Przeworski 1991: 10). Second episodes of alternation are further power-
ful signals, as they show that both sides of the political spectrum abide 
by the rules (Huntington 1991). Unsurprisingly, a growing number of 
analysts have raised concerns about the uninterrupted dominance of the 
African National Congress in South Africa and its negative implications 
for the state of the country’s democracy. 
When and How Do Elections Foster Democratic 
Progress? The Mechanisms at Work 
Any democratising effects that elections have are not systematic or pre-
determined and are seldom linear. The possibility of a democratising 
electoral outcome remains largely contingent upon a combination of 
exogenous conditions and agency, in the absence of which elections may 
prove to be tools of autocracy. Unfavourable economic performance, 
linkages to the West, and international conditionality may weaken an 
authoritarian incumbent ruler (Reuter and Gandhi 2011; Levitsky and 
Way 2010; Donno 2010) and force her/him to abide by the rules. How-
ever, in order for a democratising electoral outcome to occur, much 
depends on the strategies and choices of the contending actors – not-
ably, the incumbent, the ruling elite, and the oppositions – as well as on 
the attitudes and behaviours of citizens. At the very least, for example, 
executive turnovers require the opposition to succeed in gaining citizens’ 
support, some members of the current winning coalition to defect, and 
the incumbent ruler to concede defeat. In principle, therefore, any single 
election – including “founding” votes – can result in a democratising 
electoral outcome such as adherence to a constitutional end of tenure, a 
leadership succession, or an executive turnover.1 
In practice, this is not completely random. We argue that the likeli-
hood of a similar result is to some extent influenced by a country’s elec-
                                                 
1  In some cases, founding elections have coincided with an end to the incum-
bent’s tenure. Under the rules established for regime change in their countries, 
for example, transitional leaders Gyude Bryant, Michel Kafando, and Catherine 
Samba Panza were not eligible to run for office in the presidential elections of 
Liberia (2005), Burkina Faso (2015), and the Central African Republic (2015–
2016), respectively. 
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toral record, if it has one. Previous elections and election-related achieve-
ments can shape “the dynamics of the nested conflict between govern-
ment and opposition” that take place in a subsequent election (Schedler 
2013: 146). Thus, previously achieved democratising electoral outcomes 
are both evidence of democratic advancement and sources of further 
progress. They mould the perceptions, constraints, vulnerabilities, and 
opportunities that contending actors face in a given election, and ul-
timately their strategies, thereby increasing the likelihood of further 
democratic progress. The democratising effect of elections and election-
related events unfolds as a combination of path dependency, habituation, 
and learning mechanisms.  
When voting turns into a recurrent practice and compliance with 
crucial rules of the game becomes manifest (for example, when leaders 
step down as a term limit is met, if only to allow for intra-party succes-
sion), a clear pattern is established, at least at a procedural level. While no 
election-related achievement marks a “point of no return,” they all play a 
crucial role in shaping an overall direction. Subsequent deviations from 
the established path become increasingly costly and difficult to justify for 
those in power. As the actors’ stakes in the system and expectations 
grow hand in hand with established practice, violations may disappoint 
not only voters and the opposition, but also members of the ruling elite 
– perhaps only due to personal interest and ambition – and other power-
ful players, such as increasingly professionalised soldiers. One by one, 
election-related achievements raise expectations. This increasingly forces 
incumbents to remain on the path, even when facing an electoral defeat. 
The mere repetition of elections is fully compatible with the survival 
of a non-democratic regime. Likewise, compliance with other formal 
rules of the game is not necessarily a deterrent to the hegemony of a 
single party. The actual achievement of a democratising electoral out-
come, such as an executive turnover, largely rests on the actions of the 
opposition. Building on previous elections, opposition groups can refine 
their own strategies. Incumbent vulnerability peaks when opposition 
parties overcome their coordination dilemmas, form pre-electoral coali-
tions, endorse a single presidential candidate, run ambitious political 
campaigns, and commit to standing united and boycotting in response to 
electoral fraud (Magaloni 2010; Gandhi and Reuter 2013; Bunce and 
Wolchik 2010; Smith 2014). Previous defeats can help these opposition 
parties learn how to overcome the obstacles created by the ruling party, 
and how to correct their own mistakes (Rakner and van de Walle 2009). 
Finally, a mechanism of mutual habituation between ruling and op-
position parties is triggered by the periodic reiteration of elections. On 
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the one hand, repeated confrontation may lower the stakes of the elec-
toral competition, making a defeat more acceptable. On the other hand, 
it may induce disaffected members of the ruling party to defect and en-
dorse an opposition candidate. 
Thus, our democratisation-by-elections model focuses on elections 
and election-related events as milestones and drivers of a country’s dem-
ocratic progress. An “electoralist” approach does not account for the 
multifaceted character of democratic politics. However, the narrow ap-
proach that we adopt to capture a country’s democratisation progress, 
starting from straightforwardly observable facts, also has evident ad-
vantages in terms of focus, clarity, consistency, and reliability. 
And the Winner Is … Nigeria’s Surprising 
Presidential Election 
In March 2015, the long-standing dominance of the People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) in Nigeria came to a sudden and somewhat unexpected end, 
“shattering the myth of political incumbency” (Owen and Usman 2015: 
16) under the “least likely” circumstance of a non-open seat election 
(Cheeseman 2010). Nigerian politics has long epitomised many of Af-
rica’s political syndromes, including the militarisation, ethnicisation, and 
patrimonialisation of politics (Joseph 1999; Lewis 1996). The democrati-
sation of this complex nation is far from settled and will no doubt con-
tinue to be thorny. Nonetheless, Nigeria’s recent alternation in power 
was a remarkable democratising outcome that was made possible by the 
electoral window of opportunity of 2015 and favoured by contingent 
circumstances that weakened the incumbent. It was also decisively built 
on the progress that the country had made, election by election, since the 
1999 transition to multiparty politics.  
After a botched transition to multi-partism in 1993, Abuja eventually 
joined Africa’s wave of democratic reforms at the end of that decade. A 
fragile and uncertain democratisation process gradually gained strength, 
punctuated by five consecutive electoral rounds whose integrity followed a 
U-shaped pattern, with the 2007 vote widely considered a low point pre-
ceding marked improvements in subsequent polls. However, no single 
election under the Fourth Republic was actually devoid of progress, since 
each successive vote somehow built on previous accomplishments and 
represented an opening for new, potentially democratic steps.  
The founding elections of 1999 led to the official inauguration of a 
civilian administration headed by former general Olusegun Obasanjo, a 
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southerner, and the newly created PDP. Obasanjo and the PDP were 
confirmed in power four years later. While their second mandate was ob-
tained in a flawed poll, the 2003 vote marked the survival of electoral 
rule and the regularisation of electoral cycles in Nigeria, a valuable out-
come that no one could have taken for granted. In 2006, in accordance 
with the historic vote in which the Senate blocked the proposed removal 
of constitutional term limits, the president hand-picked a successor from 
the north, Umaru Yar’Adua. The highly criticised 2007 presidential elec-
tion was notoriously marred by grave irregularities, including multiple 
and underage voting and falsification of results (Suberu 2007). Never-
theless, it led to power being transferred for the first time from one 
civilian to another, even if both belonged to the same party. 
Leadership succession was grounded on an underlying national politi-
cal pact – known as “zoning” – whereby the presidency and other key 
offices would rotate among distinct communities. The pact came to a 
sudden end when Yar’Adua died in office in 2010. His deputy, Goodluck 
Jonathan, an Ijaw from the Niger Delta region, was sworn in. However, 
bringing the presidency back into the hands of a southerner created strong 
resentment among the political establishment from the north. The ensuing 
2011 poll confirmed Jonathan in power and turned out to be much more 
transparent and better organised than the previous one, although it was 
still one of the most violent in the country’s history (Lewis 2011). For the 
first time, the PDP share of the vote fell below 60 per cent. 
In 2015, Nigerians prepared for the fifth round of national elec-
tions. More than ever, the presidential vote was a two-horse race from 
the outset, with the newly created All Progressives Congress (APC) and 
Muhammadu Buhari, a Fulani and a former military dictator who solidly 
won the primaries, posing a powerful challenge to PDP rule. Even a run-
off would have been unprecedented in Nigeria, which operates a quali-
fied plurality/qualified majority voting system envisaging the possibility 
of as many as three ballots. After a controversial six-week postponement, 
the election eventually proceeded much more smoothly than most 
people anticipated, although not without violent incidents, reported 
irregularities, and technical problems (particularly concerning the func-
tioning of biometric card readers at polling stations). Trailing by ap-
proximately 2.5 million votes, Jonathan graciously conceded defeat as 
soon as the election outcome appeared clear, opening the way for Buhari 
to take office as Nigeria’s first-ever election-winning opposition candi-
date with no need for a run-off.  
No single overarching factor explains this outstanding outcome. A 
constellation of contingent circumstances that weakened the incumbent 
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played a role, as did conditions created by Nigeria’s 15-year experience 
with multiparty politics that related not only to the opposition and ruling 
elite’s strategic moves but also to essential improvements in electoral 
administration.  
The influence of contingent causes, such as the growing unpopular-
ity of Jonathan and the PDP, and their perceived inability to cope with 
the most urgent challenges the country was facing, should not be over-
looked. Widely respected for his anti-corruption stance, Buhari was tak-
ing on an incumbent who had been badly weakened by the deepening 
Boko Haram crisis and by deteriorating economic conditions, with the 
middle class hit by the depreciation of the naira and the poor having to 
cope with cuts in services. Over time, moreover, the PDP had become 
synonymous with rampant corruption and the prolonged marginalisation 
of the north (Hoffmann 2014). With the ruling party no longer able to 
accommodate interests and manage internal disputes – as in the tightly 
controlled and much criticised presidential primary – its continuation in 
power increasingly appeared to threaten Nigeria’s fragile political equilib-
rium (Owen and Usman 2015). 
Beyond contingent conditions, the election outcome also funda-
mentally built on previous electoral progress. This was the first time that 
the ruling PDP had faced an opposition front that had successfully 
united and become more coherent. The two competing parties to some 
extent reflected Nigeria’s north–south divide, increasingly exacerbated by 
a growing economic distance, by the Islamist insurgency of Boko Haram, 
and by the breakdown of the zoning pact. However, the APC also re-
ceived crucial support from the south-west. Launched in 2013 with the 
former governor of Lagos, Bola Tinubu, as a pivotal power broker, the 
APC resulted from the merging of four parties, including the Congress 
for Progressive Change and the All Nigeria Peoples Party, both primarily 
rooted in the north, and the Action Congress of Nigeria, with its main 
strongholds in the south-west. The inclusion of key southern politicians 
enabled Buhari, a northerner, to make massive inroads into the south-
west, where part of the dominant Yoruba community felt politically 
ignored by Jonathan. Belying many observers’ predictions, the APC did 
not implode after the presidential primary convention, whose live televi-
sion broadcast actually helped convey a message of internal democracy, 
organisational capacity, and political strength. The APC was increasingly 
perceived by many voters as a unique chance for political change and, 
given its fairly positive administrative record in Lagos and other places, 
for improved government performance. In the meantime, a remarkable 
number of defectors from the ruling party joined the APC, including five 
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state governors, some 21 deputies, and nine senators. By the end of the 
2011–2015 parliamentary term, over 40 per cent of MPs in the House of 
Representatives and as many as 14 state governors had joined the new 
opposition party. 
It was not only the opposition that showed a decisive ability to learn 
from previous failures and gain new consensus. Buhari’s victory would 
have been impossible under blatantly fraudulent conditions. After the 
grossly flawed vote of 2007, electoral correctness in Nigeria drastically 
improved, although it was still far from perfect. A reform of the Inde-
pendent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to make its budget and 
the appointment and tenure of its members genuinely autonomous from 
government interference had been advocated for years (Sklar, Onwudire, 
and Kew 2006; Akhaine 2011). While this was something Obasanjo was 
not prepared to concede, Yar’Adua had acknowledged the “shortcom-
ings” in his election and initiated an overhaul of the electoral process. 
Jonathan went further, pledging credible and competitive polls and ap-
pointing Attahiru Jega, a widely respected academic from Kano, to re-
place the discredited head of INEC. Jega quickly built on the organisa-
tion’s capacity and autonomy, particularly by compiling an entirely new 
biometric-data-based voter register that helped remove name duplica-
tions and ghost voters (Omotola 2010). As a result, while the 2011 elec-
tion was tarnished by violence, it proved much more open than had 
previously been the case and came to be seen as the freest and fairest in 
the country’s history. By 2015, INEC had adopted further technical 
improvements to reduce vote tampering during the collation process. 
Jega’s personality was instrumental in the commission’s weathering of 
criticisms and political attacks, first when the decision to delay the elec-
tion was taken, and then when an opposition victory began to loom.   
The turnover in power depended on yet another crucial factor: 
Jonathan’s readiness to acknowledge defeat and peacefully leave office. 
This was arguably a contingent factor hinging not just on the president’s 
will. Several African leaders, in a context of young or weak electoral 
arrangements, had been defeated at the polls but then more or less suc-
cessfully tried to subvert the outcome and hold on to power; examples 
ranged from Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe in 2008 to Robert Guéï and 
Laurent Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire, in 2000 and 2010, respectively. These 
incidents remind us that political will largely depends on the quality and 
solidity of the institutional environment within which decisions are 
made. Jonathan’s choice arguably reflected a certain rootedness of multi-
party contests and the process of mutual habituation that Nigerian politi-
cal adversaries had gradually undergone. Examples of similar develop-
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ments include the PDP’s acceptance of a reduced margin of victory back 
in 2011, and the Abuja Accord signed before the 2015 election, under 
the aegis of the UNDP and former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
in which the major competitors pledged to accept the electoral outcome 
(Luehrmann 2016). 
It was against this backdrop – a combination of weak government 
performance, an improved and autonomous electoral administration, a 
strongly organised and united opposition, and the incumbent’s readiness 
to accept defeat – that turned alternation in office from an ex ante possi-
bility into an ex post actual fact.  
Sub-Saharan Trajectories of  
Democratisation by Elections 
Nigeria’s recent history suggests that democratic progress, in the form of a 
democratising outcome such as executive turnover, can build decisively on 
previous election-related achievements. We now expand the scope of the 
analysis to the broader sub-Saharan context. Setting the country in a com-
parative framework, while acknowledging the peculiarities of the Nigerian 
case, can illuminate the differences and similarities among uncertain sub-
Saharan routes towards democratic progress. The purpose of this analysis 
is not to test the generalisability of the model of democratisation by 
election that we have outlined. We also refrain from assuming that democ-
ratisation is a shared goal or a point of no return. For mainly descriptive 
purposes, we use elections and election-related accomplishments as 
indicators that make it possible to bypass the dispute between demo-opti-
mists and demo-pessimists and to examine the possible signs that a pro-
cess of institutionalising democratic rules is under way, with no implicit 
assumption concerning the completion of this route in specific countries. 
Consistent with the analytical framework outlined in the first section, 
we record information on the following events: transitioning to an elec-
tion-based regime (that is, the introduction of founding elections); making 
the vote recurrent (holding second elections in due time, as evidence of an 
at least incipient pattern); establishing an endpoint for executive mandates 
(term limits are abided by, or violated, if they exist); transferring power 
within the same party (electoral intra-party succession, as the rooting of a 
conception of government as a non-personalised temporary office); and 
handing government over to the opposition (alternation in power occurs), 
which subsequently does the same (that is, a second alternation takes place, 
in line with Huntington’s two-turnover test).  
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We have drawn our data from an original Africa Leadership Change 
dataset (Carbone and Pellegata 2016) and focused on the post-Cold War 
period, when the vast majority of sub-Saharan countries (re)introduced 
competitive elections. Thus, our sample excludes countries with longer 
traditions of elections, such as Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zim-
babwe. Each country is observed since the year of its “founding election,” 
by which is meant the first of an uninterrupted series of at least two 
elections. Voting is minimally competitive when “opposition is allowed, 
multiple parties are legal, and more than one candidate is allowed on the 
ballot” (Hyde and Marinov 2011). We obtain a cross-section of 39 cases 
(plus six cases with either one or no elections), with variables recording 
what happened in each state at the time of its first, second, and subsequent 
elections, respectively. An appendix reports more detailed information for 
all our cases.  
Based on the above criteria and data, we identify six clusters of 
countries: frontrunners, on track, stagnating, backsliders, latecomers, and 
non-starters. Rather than representing regime categories or levels of 
political freedom, these clusters capture third-wave African countries’ 
various experiences with elections, as of 2015. The labels should be in-
terpreted with specific reference to the comparative context of our de-
scriptive analysis. They translate the recorded performances into differ-
ent paths of democratisation through elections. For each cluster of 
countries, Figure 1 illustrates the existing configurations of election-re-
lated democratic steps. Each tile refers to the achievement of a specific 
democratising electoral outcome, as indicated by the vertical axis. As in a 
Tetris puzzle, however, the tiles do not necessarily match. We allow 
enough flexibility for countries belonging in the same cluster to display 
slightly different combinations, or stocks, of election-related achieve-
ments. Likewise, the same stage of democratisation through elections can 
be attained via different paths.  
We clarify this point in Figure 2, which plots the paths followed by 
five representative states. Cumulative scores (vertical axis) are assigned 
election after election (horizontal axis), as countries achieve one or more 
of the election-related democratising outcomes already singled out in 
Figure 1. Countries are given a first point when they hold founding elec-
tions, and another point is assigned if a second election is held in due 
time. Additional points are granted only in the case of leadership changes. 
Electoral intra-party successions yield one point. Alternation in power 
grants a two-point increase, but only the first two episodes are counted. 
These additional points can be assigned in correspondence to any elec-
tion – first, second, and subsequent ones. Hence, a country can gain up 
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to three points at the time of its founding election if the party or the 
dictator that had been in power until the transition ran but lost the elec-
tion (for example, Madagascar in Figure 2). Because it always corres-
ponds to an episode of leadership change, compliance with a term limit 
does not improve a country’s score. Violations, on the contrary, lead to a 
one-point downward correction, as do cancellations or long postpone-
ments of elections (as was the case in Sudan between 2000 and 2010). 
Coups d’état cause any route to stop abruptly. If elections are restored, a 
country’s sequence (and score-count) restarts from the beginning (for 
example, Madagascar in Figure 2). Short-lived coups that are quickly 
ended with the reinstallation of the elected incumbent are not considered 
(such as Lesotho in 1994). 
Figure 2.  Pathways of Democratisation by Elections in Selected African 
Countries, 1990–2015 
Source: Africa Leadership Change Dataset.  
Note: The x-axis refers to a country’s first, second, and subsequent elections. The y-axis 
records, in a cumulative manner, a country’s election-related achievements, election after 
election. 
A first group of “non-starters” includes those few countries that have 
never employed multiparty elections in the post-1990 period. Cases like 
Eritrea remind us that there is no reason why a country should necessarily 
embark on processes of electoral opening up, even at times when all the 
others seem to be doing precisely that. “Latecomers” are those states that 
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have only held two consecutive elections. It is difficult to evaluate their 
actual democratic advancement, even when these recent elections fulfil 
basic standards of freedom and fairness, as in the case of Liberia. We have 
also included countries such as Angola and Guinea-Bissau, which have 
recently held elections with the potential to become “founding.”  
At the opposite extreme of Figure 1 is a modest but sizeable number 
of African “frontrunners.” Being a “frontrunner” simply indicates that a 
country has achieved more DEOs than other countries; it does not neces-
sarily correspond to fuller democratisation or democratic consolidation. 
These countries have already gone through the main electoral steps of 
democratisation, including a double-turnover test. Figure 2 tracks the 
electoral path that Ghana has followed since its 1992 founding elections. 
Ghana had a timid debut with multiparty politics, with a presidential 
election that confirmed the former military dictator Jerry Rawlings in 
power, leading to an opposition boycott. But Ghana subsequently devel-
oped into an incubator of democracy in Africa, with a stable party system 
and two successful power handovers in less than a decade. Importantly, 
the first episode of alternation occurred in 2000, when John Kufuor de-
feated the ruling party candidate in an open-seat election, following Rawl-
ings’ decision to step down in compliance with the constitutional two-term 
limit. In line with the premises, other countries in this group remind us 
that, despite previous accomplishments, the electoral pathway towards 
democracy remains fraught with uncertainties. Kenya is possibly the most 
controversial case. Beyond the country’s cumulative record of electoral 
achievements, including two episodes of turnover, the last two voting 
rounds – most notably the 2007–2008 one – were flawed, which compli-
cates the prospects for fuller democratisation of the country. 
Next is a small group of countries – including the Comoros, Sierra 
Leone, and Sao Tomé and Principe2 – that appear comparatively “on 
track” in terms of democratisation by election in Africa. In these polities, 
elections are now routine, chief executives broadly comply with the rules 
of the game, and at least one episode of alternation in office has already 
occurred. Again, the cumulative record of past electoral achievements in 
this group should not be misinterpreted as evidence of democratic dy-
namism. South Africa experienced alternation in office at the time of its 
1994 transition, and a first intra-party electoral succession due to Nelson 
Mandela’s decision not to run for a second mandate in 1999. Despite this, 
                                                 
2  As a semi-presidential system, the country has experienced several turnovers at 
the parliamentary level, as well as situations of divided government, with the 
prime minister and the president belonging to different parties. 
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democratisation in the country is arguably stalling, if not regressing, under 
the continued political dominance of the African National Congress. 
The middle of Figure 1 represents a “grey zone” of democratisation 
by election, made up of two conceptually distinct clusters. One category 
comprises “stagnating” regimes. Some of these countries have stalled any 
electoral progress beyond the periodic reiteration of voting. For instance, 
the lack of restrictions on executive mandates or their delayed introduction 
has helped the respective ruling parties build hegemonies in Gambia and 
Equatorial Guinea. In other stagnating regimes, ruling elites have main-
tained their grip on power by winning up to four consecutive elections 
while also showing some respect for the rules – for instance, by favouring 
intra-party leadership successions when a term limit has been met. This is 
the case in Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, and the Seychelles. 
The other category refers to African “backsliders,” which comprise 
by far the largest group in our sample. Among them are countries in 
which the institutionalisation of elections as the method for leadership 
selection has proved an ephemeral achievement. Togo, in Figure 2, is a 
typical case of a pseudo-democracy whose façade was openly revealed in 
2002, when President Gnassingbé Eyadéma decided to have the consti-
tution amended so that he could seek re-election once again. In roughly 
one-fifth of these cases, incumbents have removed, eluded or violated 
presidential term limits (see Appendix).  
Burundi has recently joined the group, while the Republic of the 
Congo and Rwanda are likely to do the same in the near future.3 These 
cases confirm that respect for even merely procedural prescriptions 
should not be taken for granted on a continent with a long tradition of 
“life presidencies.” Indirectly, they justify the importance that we assign 
to cases of compliance with the rules of the game. However, backsliding 
can occur in multiple ways and affect a rather heterogeneous array of 
countries. As mentioned above, being a frontrunner does not rule out 
the risk of reversal. Progress can grind to an abrupt halt even in coun-
tries with substantial experience of elections and alternation, as was the 
case in Madagascar following a 2009 coup d’état (Figure 2). 
Backsliding and stagnation emerge as the most common patterns of 
(de-)democratisation by elections in Africa. It is difficult to say whether 
one is more harmful than the other for a country’s prospects for democ-
racy – that is, to determine whether removing term limits is better or worse 
than not introducing such constitutional provisions in the first place. A 
                                                 
3  Paul Kagame of Rwanda had his country’s term limit removed in 2015, but he 
has yet to run for his third mandate. 
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case-by-case assessment is critical. In general, neither backsliding nor stag-
nation are irreversible conditions. Madagascar was able to return to multi-
party politics in 2014. Most importantly, prior to its latest election, Nigeria 
displayed many symptoms of a stagnating democratic path. As diverse as 
Tanzania and Nigeria are, until recently they both demonstrated one-party 
dominance in the context of some basic compliance with the rules of the 
game. Then 2015 came. John Magufuli was elected Tanzania’s new presi-
dent, which led to another succession at the helm of a state undisputedly 
controlled by the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party. Buhari’s opposition 
victory in Nigeria led the parallel trajectories of the two countries to part 
ways, as Figure 2 vividly depicts. The 2015 election crossroads marked a 
qualitative jump forward for Abuja, demonstrating that leadership change 
via multiparty elections was not only, or no longer, a theoretical possibility 
in Nigeria. With some delay, Nigeria appears to be following in the foot-
steps of countries such as Ghana. 
Conclusions: Alternation in Power  
as Democratisation in Africa 
We have examined the Nigerian case and the recent episode of executive 
turnover by framing them through a model of democratisation by elec-
tions, according to which democratic electoral progress can build deci-
sively, albeit not exclusively or necessarily, on previous election-related 
achievements. The mere repetition of elections does not guarantee 
democratic progress. However, when a country successfully exploits the 
openings periodically created by a multiparty election – whether it is only 
to foster constitutional rule or electoral cycles, or to allow for intra-party 
leadership successions – it also lays the foundations for further demo-
cratic steps to be made in subsequent elections. We then set Nigeria in 
the broader comparative context of African third-wave countries’ experi-
ence with multiparty elections. The analysis has highlighted both the 
merits and drawbacks of our focus on elections and election-related 
procedural achievements. With the limitations of this electoralist ap-
proach in mind, we have identified a plurality of divergent trajectories. 
Some of these paths appear more successful, or promising, than others. 
Virtually none proceeds in a linear way. The bad news is that in the vast 
majority of African countries democratisation is either stagnating or 
backsliding. The good news is that there is no unique or predetermined 
way to advance democracy. Nigeria has shown that positive political 
change remains possible even after years of apparent stagnation.  
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Our research adds to the lively debate on the democratising potential of 
elections. We start with the assumption that elections have different impacts 
on democratisation in different countries but do not aim to demonstrate 
how frequently elections advance democratisation; we try, more modestly, to 
illustrate how they can do it. Even more importantly, we explain an electoral 
outcome that would otherwise appear surprising, to a large extent. Electoral 
turnover in Nigeria’s latest election did not come by chance, nor was it only 
the consequence of circumstances contingent on the phase the country was 
going through at the time of voting. Instead, it should be interpreted in light 
of the country’s electoral record. In Nigeria, previous electoral rounds 
proved fundamental to instilling respect for term limits, to experiencing 
presidential successions, to improving electoral administration, and to 
gaining familiarity with the game of ballot-box competition.  
The critical remaining question is what lies ahead for Nigeria. The 
country’s first-ever constitutional transfer of power to the opposition, fol-
lowing the electoral defeat of an incumbent president, is an unquestionable 
achievement and sets a precedent whose significance can hardly be under-
estimated. Its import should also be evaluated in light of the relative rarity 
of similar events in the region. While the reforms of the 1990s engendered 
a huge rise in multiparty polls, electoral turnovers have only occurred in a 
minority of no more than 18 countries. In most of these cases, moreover, 
opposition leaders were able to win office only under the fluidity of 
founding elections. Nevertheless, it would be naïve to consider the out-
come of the latest election as a verdict of successful democratisation.  
We do not know whether Nigeria will be able to remain “on track” 
and consolidate its recent democratic gains. Several African states have 
shown that backsliding is a concrete possibility, even after years of gen-
uinely democratic experience. Whatever the democratic advancement 
that Nigeria may have reached, it certainly does not rest on solid ground. 
Endemic communal tensions, political instability in the north, the fiscal 
woes caused by the oil price fall, corrupt and poorly accountable state 
governments (Albin-Lackey 2012), and the cohesion of the new ruling 
party are only a few of the challenges that the country faces. However, 
similarly to other democratising electoral outcomes, executive turnover is 
not only evidence of democratic progress but also a potential driver of 
further achievements. The replacement of an underperforming govern-
ment at the polls can renew democratic legitimacy (Bratton 2004). Alter-
nation in power can also have a positive moderating effect on citizens’ 
perceptions of the stakes of political competition (Moehler and Lindberg 
2009). More concretely, democratic progress can help a country like 
Nigeria overcome several of its current political and socio-economic 
challenges – such as corruption (Kolstad and Wiig 2016), growth (Car-
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bone et al. 2016), and human development (Kudamatsu 2012; Harding 
and Stasavage 2014) – even if democratisation remains incomplete and 
fragile (Cassani and Carbone 2016). This could trigger a virtuous cycle. 
Finally, some potentially favourable conditions for further demo-
cratic development are present in Nigeria, including its emerging party 
system. Holding APC-like multiregional alliances together will be diffi-
cult. However, the fact that the APC is politically, socially, and organisa-
tionally rooted in the parties that have merged into it implies that elec-
toral competition in 2015 somehow rested on established patterns. The 
Nigerian party system is not a typical inchoate system, prone to electoral 
volatility and uncertainty, suffering from the weak organisation, authority 
and social linkages of its component parties. Although the two main 
parties are primarily rooted in distinct areas of the country, both are 
broadly “national” in scope. These factors may dissuade the new govern-
ment from seeking illicit advantages to remain in power – for instance, 
by manipulating ethno-regional qualms (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; 
Wahman 2012). Political developments will not go smoothly in Nigeria, 
but the establishment of democracy is seldom a linear process. Even in 
the history of Western Europe, setbacks and failures were integral parts 
of long-term progress (Berman 2007: 38–39). The 2015 election lifted 
Nigeria out of the marshes of democratic stagnation and marked the 
zenith of its entire democratic history. With all the necessary caveats, 
Abuja made a remarkable jump forward, although where exactly the 
country will land will remain uncertain for quite some time to come. 
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Nigeria und demokratischer Fortschritt durch Wahlen in Afrika 
Zusammenfassung: Wahlen fördern nicht immer die demokratische 
Entwicklung von Staaten, aber sie können zur Demokratisierung beitra-
gen. Die Autoren entwerfen ein Modell der Demokratisierung durch 
Wahlen, in dem die Möglichkeiten für politischen Wandel, die in jeder 
Wahlrunde eröffnet werden, auf den demokratischen Fortschritten basie-
ren, die in früheren Wahlen erreicht werden konnten. Dabei liegt ihr Fokus 
auf Nigeria. Sie interpretieren den jüngsten Führungswechsel in Nigeria 
unter Bezug auf vorangegangene Wahlen und ziehen einen Vergleich zu 
Demokratisierungsprozessen in anderen Staaten Afrikas. Auf der Basis 
eines neuen Datensatzes zum Führungswechsel in afrikanischen Staaten 
untersuchen sie Ereignisse im Umfeld von Wahlen und ermitteln die un-
terschiedlichen Entwicklungsformen afrikanischer Regime seit 1990. Dabei 
kommen zwei wesentliche Probleme zum Vorschein: Stagnation und 
Rückentwicklung der Demokratisierung. In einer größeren Gruppe von 
Ländern sind allerdings schrittweise Fortschritte bei der Institutionalisie-
rung der Demokratie erzielt worden. Die Autoren konstatieren, dass es 
zwar keinen vorgezeichneten Weg der Demokratisierung gibt, wiederkeh-
rende Wahlen aber zur Vertiefung der Demokratie beitragen können. 
Schlagwörter: Afrika, Nigeria, Politischer Wandel, Demokratisierung, 
Nationale Wahlen, Vergleichende Analyse 
 
